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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 14/04/2008

Accident number: 567

Accident time: 11:40

Accident Date: 21/05/2007

Where it occurred: Bazuriyah Village,
Area 7-001

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: 004/2007

Date of main report: 04/06/2007
Name of source: UNMAS

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: DPICM M77
submunition

Ground condition: building rubble
hard
metal scrap
residential/urban
Date last modified: 14/04/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM 712082/3681844 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate area marking (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)

Accident report
The reports for this accident were made available in February 2008 as a collection of files and
pictures. Their conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been
lost. The substance of the reportd is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files
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are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. The Board of Inquiry carried out by the MAC is
followed by the demining group’s internal inquiry report.

REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 004/2007
BAC Accident that occurred in Area 7-001 (CBU 40), UTM 712082/36844 on the 21st May
2007 in which a civilian was injured (now died as of 7th Jun 07).
References:
•

Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)

•

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)

•

[Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

•

Map: UNIFIL JENIMAP

•

MACC SL Mine / UXO information

Introduction
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC
SL Programme Manager, [Name removed] and Lt. Col [Name removed], NDO
Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on Monday 21st May, for an accident
investigation Board of Inquiry (BOI). The MACC SL board members are Capt. [Name
removed], LAF QA Officer MACC SL, Lt [Name removed], LAF OPS Officer MACC SL and
[Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Accident that occurred on
21st May 2007 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining group] internal
investigation report, statements from [Demining group] personnel involved in the accident
(Annex A), visits to and photographs from the accident site, the accident is considered
preventable.
3. The [Demining group] investigation report was forwarded to the BOI on 23rd May 2007 and
is attached at Annex B. The accident occurred at approx.1140hrs on the 21st May 2007 in
Area 7-001 CBU 40 situated near the village of Bazuriyah, UTM 712082/3681844, additional
information is:
Date: 21st May 2007
Time of Incident: 1200hrs approx [sic].
Location: Bazuriyah, Area 7-001, Lebanon
Task: CBU-40, Task Dossier 7-001
UTM of location of the munition: 712082/2681844
Task Start / Finish Date: 28th February 07 to task not yet completed
Reported by: Mr. [Name removed], Site Supervisor
Reported to: Operations Department, MACC SL
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1200hrs approx.
MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed], PM [Demining group]
Investigation Date/Time: 21st May 07, 1300hrs
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Investigation Location: Task CBU - 40
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed], LAF QA Officer, Lt [Name removed], LAF
Operations Officer and [Name removed], MACC SL C of QA.
Explosive Ordnance Type: US M-77 Sub-munition
Background
4. CBU 40 is part of Task Dossier 7-001 which is a cluster strike area from the recent conflict.
The area is a mixture of buildings, house from the town of Bazuriyah and adjacent land used
for growing orange and other citrus fruits. The area is contaminated with Israeli fired M77 submunitions.
5. [Demining group] commenced clearance at this site, 7-001, on 28th February 2007, but the
task was [Demining group] internal suspended for two weeks while the Site Supervisor, Mr
[Name removed] was on a programmed leave period. Up to the time of the accident
[Demining group] BAC team 2 had been operational in CBU 40 for a total of ……x [Missing in
original] operational days. 21 x M77s and 1 x 122mm fuse were located during operations,
with a total of 20,850m2 visually searched and 59,377m2 sub-surface searched.
6. The area where the accident occurred was adjacent to a new building construction site,
portions of this area were used by the local population as a rubbish dump. In addition the area
was within the residential housing area and was used as an access for the delivery of building
materials to the adjacent construction site. It was reported at the time of the accident that a
sub-munition had detonated due to rubble being disposed from the building site, on the 4th
May 2007. There is no record of the MACC SL being informed of this incident, with no Ops or
QA follow up investigation occurring. Up to the day of the accident, the area where the
accident occurred had been visual searched only and limited marking had occurred at this
portion of the site, but was removed by the local population. CLOs had visited the local
authorities, local population (around the site area) and the workers on the building site.
Events leading up to the Accident
7. On the morning of 21st May 2007 at approximately 0630hrs [Demining group] BAC Team 2
re-deployed back to CBU 040 to start operations. At approximately 1140hrs, an uncontrolled
explosion occurred at the building site adjacent to the rear of the BAC Team 2 CP, UTM
712082/3681844, involving a civilian worker, Mr. [the Victim], who was delivering building
material to the construction site. Mr. [the Victim] had reversed his truck on the area adjacent
the construction site and had commenced to unload the vehicle. During this process Mr. [the
Victim] kicked, stepped or dropped some building materials on a M77 sub-munition that was
most likely sub-surface causing it to detonate.
Events following the Accident
8. The [Demining group] Site Supervisor, Mr. [Name removed] immediately stopped search
operations and deployed the team medic to provide emergency medical treatment and then
transport [the Victim] by ambulance to the nearest hospital, at Jabal Amel, arriving at 1210hrs
approx.
BOI Post Accident Activities and General Observations
9. On arrival at the accident scene and after an initial reconnaissance by the Investigation
Officers, it was ascertained that the BOI could gain safe access up to the accident scene
without additional clearance being conducted.
10. On inspection of the accident scene on the 21st May 2007 the following general
observations were established:
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•

There had been an uncontrolled detonation of an M77 Sub-munition,

•

The M77 was either partially or completely buried,

•

The area of the detonation was surface cleared and suspended pending sub-surface
clearance,

•

The area was being used to store building materials for the adjacent building site,

•

New area marking materials, posts and tape, had been erected at the site,

•

Evidence of previous marking items were around the general vicinity of the area, and

•

The vehicle had been removed from the site.

Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking
11. Task Dossier Area 7-001 was issued to [Demining group] in April 2007. The TD contains
details of … x [Missing in original] CBU strikes. Up to the time of the accident a total area of
80,215 m² (surface and sub-surface) of the area had been cleared, resulting in the disposal of
a total number of 21 x Sub-Munitions.
Geography and Weather
12. CBU 040 is located in a mixed urban, agriculture and citrus area. The ground where the
accident occurred was hard and covered with rubbish and building materials.
Site Layout and Marking
13. The site layout and minefield marking prior to the accident was in accordance with
National TSGs and [Demining group] SOPs, however the marking around the area of the
accident had been removed by the general public and replaced several times.
Management, Supervision and Discipline
14. There are no reports of disciplinary action being taken against any [Demining group]
personnel on CBU 40 to date.
Quality Assurance
15. External QA was carried out by the MACC SL QA Section; the last External QA
Evaluation on [Demining group] BAC Team 2 was conducted on 3rd May 2007, Battle Area
Clearance, (Form E), carried out by QA Officer [Name removed]; all evaluation results were
acceptable.
Communications and Reporting
16. Communications between CBU 40 and [Demining group] base location are maintained
via the use of cell phone. On site communications between teams are also maintained via
VHF handheld radios.
17. On the day of the accident, the site had proper and appropriate communications and
managed to pass all relevant accident information back to [Demining group] base location,
which in turn passed the information to the MACC SL in a timely manner.
Medical Details
18. [The Victim] suffered blast injuries to both feet and received head injuries. After the
[Demining group] medic administered medical treatment and he was stabilised onsite he was evacuated by road to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre.
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Details of Sub-Munitions Involved
19. The M77 HE cluster bomb is commonly referred to among the Lebanese and Palestinian
population as the “battery bomb” or “lighter” bomb because of its shape. There M77 HE
grenades are dispensed from various sizes of projectiles, which are initiated my mechanical
times fuses above the target areas to allow dispersion of the grenade. The M77 has a white
nylon ribbon which when pulled or touched can detonate. Shortly after ejection from the
projectile, artillery shell or various size of container or dispenser, the M77 HE grenade arms
due to the rotation of the white nylon ribbon. This ribbon also acts as stabilizing tail to orient
the cone of the grenade towards the target. Upon impact a charge in the grenade launched
downward to penetrate armour while the metal grenade body bursts into shrapnel-like
fragments to wound and kill personnel. The M77 has a white [grey] band around its body.
US M-77

Conclusions
20. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the
following:
A M77 detonated after [the Victim] either stood, kicked or dropped building materials on the
sub-munition.
The accident occurred in a surface cleared area,
1. The CASEVAC was conducted in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs, with the
casualty given appropriate first aid and transported by ambulance to the nearest
hospital in good time.
2. There was an uncontrolled detonation most likely of a M77 that occurred on the 4th
May 2007 that was not reported to the MACC.
3. The area where the accident occurred had been marked with pickets and tape but
this was removed or damaged and not been replaced or maintained either during the
internal suspension and the clearance of the CBU task.
4.

The local population had not adhered to warnings of the danger of this area, by CLOs
[Community Liaison Officers].

Recommendations
21. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•

The area of the accident is to sub-surface cleared, immediately.
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•

[Deming group] is to report all uncontrolled detonations, at all CBU tasks and any
related detonations, to the MACC SL to allow correct follow up investigations and
operational clearance plan adjustments to be made. Revise all [Demining group]
operational staff and office personnel in this requirement.

•

[Demining group] is to maintain making/warning materials during the clearance
process and during periods of internal suspensions or when period of leave or standdown by the supervisor.

•

Contact the relevant NDO/MACC SL Operations Officer to address the movement of
public in urban areas to adjust clearance plans if required.

Signed: C/QA Officer

, MACC SL

; LAF QA Officer

, NDO/MACC SL

4th June May 07
Site Photographs

[Point of detonation was beneath the pile of reinforcing bar.]

[The reinforcing bar is in the centre of this picture near to the building.]

Internal [Demining group] accident report
INVESTIGATION REPORT ON A M77 SUB-MUNITION ACCIDENT AT CBU 040, AREA 7001. Al Bazuriyah
The incident occurred in Area 7001 (CBU 040), UTM 0712082 3681844 on the 21st May
2007, on an active BAC site. One M77 Sub-Munition was detonated by a construction worker
whilst unloading a truck containing building materials.
References:
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Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
[Demining group] Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Introduction
In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), and [Demining
group] Standing Operating Procedures SOPs the Programme Manager of [Demining group],
Mr. [Name removed] instructed that an internal investigation into the above incident be carried
out.
This Report will form part of the NDO / MACC SL report into the incident which occurred on
the 21st may 2007. The initial investigation by [Demining group] investigation team
established that: The incident is considered not preventable.
Relevant facts
Date: 21st May 2007
Time of Incident: 11:40h approximately.
Location: Al Bazuriyah, Lebanon
Task: CBU-040, Task Dossier 7-001
UTM of location of the munition: 0712082 3681844
Task Start / Finish Date: 28th February 2007 Task ongoing.
Reported by: Mr. [Name removed]
Reported to: QA Department, MACC SL
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 12:00hrs approx.
MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed]
Investigation Date/Time: 21tst May 2007, 12:30hrs
Investigation Location: Task CBU -040
Investigation Team: Mr [Name removed], [Name removed], Programme manager/Head of
Mission (HoM)
Explosive Ordnance Type: US M -77 Sub-munition
Background
CBU 040 forms part of task Dossier 7-001 issued to [Demining group] for BAC clearance as
part of the sub-munitions clearance programme in South Lebanon. CBU 040 is an active
clearance site. According to [Demining group] site files for the task, the area where the
incident occurred, has been surface cleared only in accordance the TSGs and [Demining
group] SOP, to reduce the immediate risk posed by cluster munitions. The intension for CBU
040, as per the clearance plan, is to return to this area once higher priority areas have been
cleared sub-surface. The Clearance mythology for CBU 040 is to clear all, none hard
standing contaminated areas, sub-surface.
Events leading up to the Incident
According to witness reports, See Annex D, on the morning of the 21st May 2007 at
approximately 11:30, an explosion occurred behind the CP of CBU 040. Evidence at the site
of the incident and from eye witnesses indicated that the construction worker either stepped
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or dropped a length of reinforcing bar on an obscured cluster bomb causing it to high order
detonate.
Events following the Incident
The first [Demining group] staff member to arrive at the scene of the incident reported that a
group of people was surrounding one casualty laying on the ground. Shortly after the site
medic arrived at the scene and, assisted by one BAC operator, approached the casualty to
administer first aid. During the period the casualty was receiving first aid, and up to the point
when the casualty was removed to hospital, the team leader of bravo team was coordinating
at the incident site and the supervisor, [Name removed], was at the CP from where he was in
overall command and control of the incident.
The site supervisor immediately contacted [Demining group] Ops room by cell phone to
inform the Programme Manager Mr [Name removed]. In addition [Name removed] also
contacted [Name removed] at MACC OPS to report the location and circumstances relating to
the incident. Immediately the programme manager went to the incident location to assist in
the initial investigation.
Post Incident Activities and General Observations
On arrival at the incident site, the programme manager accompanied the site supervisor
attended the site. The site was accessed along a section of hard standing. From the
evidence on the ground and from information contained within the site file is seems likely that
the injuries sustained by the casualty were from an M77 Sub-munition.
Observations at the site also revealed the following:
•

The area in which the suspected sub-munition had detonated would seem to indicate
that the munition was sub-surface

•

A quantity of concrete reinforcing bar was directly adjacent to the site of the
explosion.

•

The site of the explosion was also contaminated by other construction and general
debris.

Geography and Weather
CBU 040 is located the village of Al Bazuriyah. The land is primarily a waste/dumping area
adjacent to an ongoing construction site and residential dwellings.
Conclusions
Based on the investigation, site documentation and site visit by the PM and the Site
Supervisor the following conclusion can be drawn:
•

The incident was probably the result of the victim either stepping on the sub-munition
or dropping a length of reinforcing bar on to it.

•

The location of the sub-munitions was identified as in an area that surface clearance
had taken place

•

The sub-munitions was in a designated danger area

•

The sub-munition was probably sub-surface or obscured by building debris.

•

Dangerous area making pickets and mine tape have been removed on numerous
occasions, despite repeated warning to the local population by [Demining group]
CLO.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on the [Demining group] internal investigation:
•

[Demining group] CLO, supported by MACC Ops CLO should continue to warn local
residents that the areas has been surface cleared only, and still poses a dangerous to
local residents.

•

Sub-surface clearance of the area is carried out as a priority.

•

Appropriate warning signs and mine furniture is erected and checked daily by
clearance teams.

Signed: Programme Manager/Head of Mission; Site Supervisor, [Demining group] I
BAC team
21st May 2007

Victim Report
Victim number: 741

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 40

Gender: Male

Status: civilian

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: None

Protection issued: None

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
severe Abdomen
severe Arms
severe Chest
severe Head
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Eye
Toes
FATAL
COMMENT: See Medical report

Medical report
An IMSMA report confirmed that the victim was male and born in 1967. The time of the
accident was recorded as 11:38.
•

The IMSMA sketches record:

•

Loss of eyesight right side

•

Loss of foot/toes, left side.

•

Other injuries to head, chest, abdomen and upper limbs.
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The victim went to the accident place because “is easy for him to lift the construction
materials.”
The area where the accident happened was not marked.
The victim died on 7th June 2007, 17 days after the accident.

Statements
Statement 1: TEAM 2, Team Leader
On 21-5-2007 around 11:30 while I was having my lunch in the control point which is located
in a building close to the main road and next to the old municipality building I heard an
explosion and directly people screaming and shouting saying that a civilian was injured.
Immediately, I ran to the accident place and I saw from a distance lot people and one person
laying on the ground and [Demining group]'s medic giving him the medical support and beside
him one operator. Quickly, I started to ask the people to leave the accident area and give the
medic a space to do his job but the people did not respond. Meanwhile, the ambulance was
ready to transport the victim to the hospital. After the medic finished his job, he put the
casualty on the spin board and then holds him to the vehicle with the assistant of the civil
defence guys.
Regarding the accident place or land, it was cleared visually and the reason why it was not
cleared instrumentally is because of the nature of the land and because it is close to a
construction project and therefore it is full of metals note that it is a hard land to clear due to
many slopes inside especially between the accident place and the building there.
We reported to the municipality that we still need to work in that area and put around that area
pickets and tapes but people did not respond and the construction project continued.

Statement 2: Team 2 QC
AT 11:40, I was doing some work in the field when I heard an explosion. Directly I ran to the
explosion place because I assumed that it took place in our operation area. When I got there I
did what I should do. There were around 20 people around someone laying on the ground. I
started asking the people to leave the place since it is a dangerous area. Meanwhile the
medic was giving medical support to the casualty. Later and after few minutes an ambulance
came and took the casualty to the hospital. I kept asking the people to stay away from the
dangerous area.

Statement 3: Team 2, Operator
During lunch hour, I was having my meal close to the control point and after that I went to the
neighbours to get some water and suddenly I heard an explosion and I look behind me and I
saw a man laying on the ground. Quickly I went down to the control point looking for the team
leader and the medic. They both came to the accident place and the medic stared to give
medical support for the casualty and later on an ambulance took the casualty to the hospital.

Statement 4: Team 3, Operator
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On the 21- 5-2007 and at 11:35, I was working on putting out a fire across the control point, I
heard an explosion and people screaming. I thought that some one from our team was
injured. I ran to the accident place and I saw the casualty on the ground and lot of people
around him. After giving him the medical support he was moved to the ambulance and then to
the hospital.

Analysis
Marking had been placed in the area and removed by local people during a stand-down.
When the deminers returned, it seems that the marking was not replaced. Statements raise
doubts whether there was ever any intention to clear that area using sub-surface detectors.
Whether or not this was the case, questions about the suitability of the procedures in place
arise. The procedure of carrying out a surface check followed by a later sub-surface
clearance puts deminers at risk from buried ordnance and may also give civilians a false
confidence that the area has been cleared when it has not. The photograph of the accident
site shows a shallow crater indicating that the device was not deeply buried and may have
been close to (or on) the surface.
Lack of control after the accident meant that civilians crowded around on a known hazardous
area.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the
demining group did not ensure that the hazardous area was clearly marked. The presence of
buildings materials inside the area indicated that local people were using the area, but nothing
was done to prevent this. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control
inadequacy” because the procedures to keep civilians out of working areas do not seem to
have been in place, or were not enforced.
There had been a previous uncontrolled detonation (4th May) that had not been reported to
the MAC, which implies that the Demining group did not take the MAC’s requirement to report
unintended detonations seriously. Had it been reported, it is possible that the Community
Liaison Teams might have used that as evidence and prevented the Victim entering the work
area while it was clearly still hazardous.

11

